Funding public projects: A case for the Nash product rule F Brandl, F Brandt, M Greger, D Peters, C Stricker, W Suksompong Journal of Mathematical Economics 99, 102585, 2022 | 32 | 2022 |
Distribution Rules Under Dichotomous Preferences: Two Out of Three Ain’t Bad F Brandl, F Brandt, D Peters, C Stricker Proceedings of the 22nd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (ACM-EC), 2021 | 28 | 2021 |
Voting with ties: Strong impossibilities via SAT solving F Brandt, C Saile, C Stricker Proceedings of the 17th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and …, 2018 | 22 | 2018 |
An Analytical and Experimental Comparison of Maximal Lottery Schemes F Brandl, C Brandt, Felix, Stricker Social Choice and Welfare, 2021 | 17 | 2021 |
Donor Coordination: Collective Distribution of Individual Contributions F Brandl, F Brandt, D Peters, C Stricker, W Suksompong | 10 | 2019 |
Strategyproof Social Choice When Preferences and Outcomes May Contain Ties F Brandt, C Saile, C Stricker | 9* | |
The incompatibility of Fishburnstrategyproofness and Pareto-efficiency F Brandt, M Eberl, C Saile, C Stricker Archive of Formal Proofs, 2018 | 7 | 2018 |
An Analytical and Experimental Comparison of Maximal Lottery Schemes F Brandl, F Brandt, C Stricker IJCAI, 2018 | | 2018 |