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Joseph Root
Joseph Root
Dirección de correo verificada de uchicago.edu - Página principal
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Incentives and efficiency in constrained allocation mechanisms
J Root, DS Ahn
arXiv preprint arXiv:2006.06776, 2020
142020
A topological proof of the Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem
Y Baryshnikov, J Root
Economics Letters 234, 111447, 2024
12024
Efficiency in Random Resource Allocation and Social Choice
F Echenique, J Root, F Sandomirskiy
arXiv preprint arXiv:2203.06353, 2022
12022
The Provision of Information and Incentives in School Assignment Mechanisms
D Neal, J Root
National Bureau of Economic Research, 2024
2024
Stable matching as transportation
F Echenique, J Root, F Sandomirskiy
arXiv preprint arXiv:2402.13378, 2024
2024
Local Priority Mechanisms
J Root, DS Ahn
arXiv preprint arXiv:2309.04020, 2023
2023
Royal Processions: Incentives, Efficiency and Fairness in Two-Sided Matching
J Root, S Bade
Proceedings of the 24th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 1077-1077, 2023
2023
Royal Processions: Incentives, Efficiency and Fairness in Two-sided Matching
S Bade, J Root
arXiv preprint arXiv:2301.13037, 2023
2023
Market Design Under Constraints
J Root
UC Berkeley, 2020
2020
Constrained Allocation and Hypergraphs
JW Root
University of California, Berkeley, 2020
2020
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Artículos 1–10