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Debasis Mishra
Title
Cited by
Cited by
Year
Ascending price Vickrey auctions for general valuations
D Mishra, DC Parkes
Journal of Economic Theory 132 (1), 335-366, 2007
180*2007
Multi-item vickrey-dutch auctions
D Mishra, DC Parkes
Games and Economic Behavior 66 (1), 326-347, 2009
92*2009
Cost sharing in a job scheduling problem
D Mishra, B Rangarajan
Social Choice and Welfare 29 (3), 369-382, 2007
87*2007
Characterization of the Walrasian equilibria of the assignment model
D Mishra, D Talman
Journal of Mathematical Economics 46 (1), 6-20, 2010
572010
Mechanism design without quasilinearity
T Kazumura, D Mishra, S Serizawa
Theoretical Economics 15 (2), 511-544, 2020
412020
Implementation in Multidimensional Dichotomous Domains
D Mishra, S Roy
Theoretical Economics, 2013
362013
Roberts' theorem with neutrality: A Social welfare ordering approach
D Mishra, A Sen
Games and Economic Behavior, 2012
362012
Descending price multi-item auctions
D Mishra, R Garg
Journal of Mathematical Economics 42 (2), 161-179, 2006
342006
Minimum cost arborescences
B Dutta, D Mishra
Games and Economic Behavior 74 (1), 120-143, 2012
332012
Strategy-proof multi-object mechanism design: Ex-post revenue maximization with non-quasilinear preferences
T Kazumura, D Mishra, S Serizawa
Journal of Economic Theory 188, 105036, 2020
322020
Vickrey-Dutch procurement auction for multiple items
D Mishra, D Veeramani
European journal of operational research 180 (2), 617-629, 2007
322007
Implementation with contingent contracts
R Deb, D Mishra
Econometrica 82 (6), 2371-2393, 2014
31*2014
A characterization of the average tree solution for tree games
D Mishra, AJJ Talman
International Journal of Game Theory 39 (1), 105-111, 2010
29*2010
Separability and aggregation of equivalence relations
D Dimitrov, T Marchant, D Mishra
Economic Theory, 1-22, 2010
272010
AUCTION OF MULTIPLE HETEROGENEOUS ITEMS AMONG MULTIPLE BUYERS AND SELLERS USING SOFTWARE AGENTS LINKED VIA A COMMUNICATION NETWORK
R Garg, D Mishra
US Patent App. 12/194,572, 2008
27*2008
Mechanism design with two alternatives in quasi-linear environments
T Marchant, D Mishra
Social Choice and Welfare 44, 433-455, 2015
252015
On optimal mechanism design for a sequencing problem
J Duives, B Heydenreich, D Mishra, R Müller, M Uetz
Journal of scheduling 18, 45-59, 2015
242015
A multi-attribute reverse auction for outsourcing
D Mishra, D Veeramani
Database and Expert Systems Applications, 2002. Proceedings. 13th …, 2002
242002
Multidimensional mechanism design in single peaked type spaces
D Mishra, A Pramanik, S Roy
Journal of Economic Theory 153, 103-116, 2014
232014
Non-bossy single object auctions
D Mishra, A Quadir
Economic Theory Bulletin 2, 93-110, 2014
232014
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Articles 1–20